Inclusive Real
Estate Secured Transaction Opinion
In Which are Incorporated the Principal Concepts
of
The ABA Section of Business Law
Legal Opinion Accord
and
The ABA Section of Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law
and
The American College of Real Estate Lawyers
Report on Adaptation of the Legal Opinion Accord
A REPORT OF THE JOINT ABA/ACREL COMMITTEE COMPRISING:
The American Bar Association, Section of Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law, Committee on Legal Opinions in Real Estate Transactions, Subcommittee
on Creation of an Inclusive Opinion:
David L. Miller, Washington, D.C., Co-Chair; Mark R. Spradling,
Houston, Texas, Co-Chair; Benson Joel Barr, Southfield, Michigan; Gurdon H.
Buck, Hartford, Connecticut; Frederic W. Clark, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
Dianne S. Coscarelli, Cleveland, Ohio; William B. Dunn, Detroit, Michigan;
Kenneth P. Ezell, Jr., Nashville, Tennessee; Timothy W. Grooms, Little Rock,
Arkansas; Karl B. Holtzschue, New York, New York; Raymond Iwamoto, Honolulu,
Hawaii; Thelma Rivera-Miranda, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico; Robert A. Thompson, San
Francisco, California; and William L. Thompson, Jacksonville, Florida; and
AMERICAN COLLEGE
OF REAL ESTATE LAWYERS ATTORNEYS’ OPINIONS COMMITTEE: Edward J. Levin, Baltimore,
Maryland, Chair; Portia O. Morrison, Chicago, Illinois, Co-Vice Chair; Charles
S. Sokoloff, Smithfield, Rhode Island, Co-Vice Chair; Robert A. Thompson, San
Francisco, California, Co-Vice Chair; Charles H. Andresen, Duluth, Minnesota;
David C. Auten, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Drake M. Batchelder, Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida; Wm. Terry Bray, Austin, Texas; Stephen A. Bromberg,
Birmingham, Michigan; Gurdon H. Buck, Hartford, Connecticut; Mert F. Buckley,
Wichita, Kansas; James A. Cole, Baltimore, Maryland; William B. Dunn, Detroit, Michigan;
A. James Elliott, Atlanta, Georgia; K. Gregory Erwin, Houston, Texas; Howard M.
Feuerstein, Portland, Oregon; Joseph Finley, Minneapolis, Minnesota; W. Bebb
Francis, III, San Antonio, Texas; Catherine T. Goldberg, Albuquerque, New
Mexico; Martin Gottlieb, Boston, Massachusetts; Donald J. Gralen, Chicago,
Illinois; Samuel F. Hatcher, Atlanta, Georgia; Robert O. Hetlage, St. Louis,
Missouri; Karl B. Holtzschue, New York, New York; John B. Hood, Rochester, New
York; Morris C. Kellett, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Henry M. Kittleson,
Lakeland, Florida; Daniel L. Klein, Wilmington, Delaware; Michael Levin,
Hartford, Connecticut; Timothy Martin, Louisville, Kentucky; Thomas A. Mason,
Cleveland, Ohio; William L. McCown, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; K.C. McDaniel, New
York, New York; Russell A. McNair, Jr., Detroit, Michigan; O’Malley M. Miller,
Los Angeles, California; Allan E. Mulligan, Bloomington, Minnesota; J. Fred Powell, Birmingham, Alabama;
Laurence G. Preble, New York, New York; Myrna Putziger, Boston, Massachusetts;
Susan M. Reid, San Franciso, California; Richard L. Reppert, Cleveland, Ohio;
Leon J. Reymond, Jr., New Orleans, Louisiana; Thomas G. Roberts, Los Angeles,
California; James Rosenbloom, Chicago, Illinois; Stanley M. Samuels, Portland,
Oregon; Richard W. Scarritt, Kansas City, Missouri; Leopold Z. Sher, New
Orleans, Louisiana; David S. Sidor, Columbus, Ohio; Gary A. Taback, Southfield,
Michigan; Courtland Traver, McLean, Virginia; Ira J. Waldman, Los Angeles,
California; James H. Wallenstein, Dallas, Texas; James G. Wheeler, Jr., St.
Johnsbury, Vermont; and Jeffrey P. Zucker, Las Vegas, Nevada.
Inclusive Real Estate Secured Transaction Opinion
I. INTRODUCTION
The
ABA Legal Opinion Accord and the report of which it is a part[1]
are impressive in many ways, and have received some acceptance, but they have
yet to become the nationwide standard that their authors had hoped. Particularly given the availability of state
bar association reports in many jurisdictions, practitioners have evidenced
mixed responses to learning a new body of legal opinion practices. This is at least in part because the Accord
looks and perhaps is difficult to master and the Accord omits coverage of many
substantive areas common to legal opinions in real estate transactions.
To address at
least the latter issue, a joint committee of the ABA and the American College
of Real Estate Lawyers published a report adapting the Accord for loans secured
by real property.[2] But, if the Accord is difficult to master,
it is even a more challenging task to achieve a clear and comprehensive
knowledge of how the Accord works as supplemented—and modified—by the ABA/ACREL
Report.
The principal
goal of this report is to facilitate understanding of the ABA Business Law
Report (including the Accord) and the ABA/ACREL Report (collectively, the “Opinion Reports”).
II. FALSE BREVITY
One of the
fundamental approaches of the Accord, which the ABA/ACREL Report also follows,
is that each legal opinion letter that is to be governed by the Accord (or the Accord
as modified and supplemented by the ABA/ACREL Report) will incorporate those
documents by reference. This would
result in very short opinion letters, and in the ability to quickly check any
variations between a given opinion letter and the Accord or the ABA/ACREL
Report.
While brevity
undoubtedly is a virtue (and is the soul of wit[3]), this brevity
is only skin deep. Behind the
short-form of Accord opinion lies a complex set of code-like and specific
interpretive rules that have no history of interpretation by courts. No attorney will or should give or receive
an opinion that incorporates the Accord or the ABA/ACREL Report without being
sufficiently comfortable that he or she understands those documents and how
they are likely to be interpreted in the future. Few have achieved this level of comfort.
III. INCLUSIVE OPINION
FORM
Despite these
difficulties, we believe that the goals of the Opinion Reports are worth
pursuing and that these publications are worth understanding.
The Joint
Committee believes that it would enhance the understanding of the Opinion
Reports if we could show how an opinion might look if it included the principal
concepts contained in these two published opinion letter reports, without
specifically referring to them; that is, a kind of one stop shopping. The form of opinion letter which follows
this brief introduction attempts to do just that for real estate loans, the
most common kind of real estate transactions giving rise to third-party legal
opinion letters.
This form of opinion
letter is intended primarily to serve an educational purpose, not to serve as a
model. We also recognize that this form
of opinion is not the only way to set forth the positions stated in the Opinion
Reports. This form of opinion letter
perhaps gives rise to the opposite of the risk of false brevity, the risk of
false comprehensiveness; nor does this form expressly cover each principle
stated in the Opinion Reports. Finally,
both the Opinion Reports permit private ordering between the parties to each
transaction, the use of which would result in changes to the opinions,
assumptions and other qualifications in this form.
The Opinion
Reports both are useful and constitute significant progress toward achievement
of a national consensus for real estate opinion practice. We intend through this “inclusive” form of
opinion letter to enhance understanding of the meaning of the Opinion
Reports.
INCLUSIVE REAL ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTION OPINION
[date]
[Name and
Address
of Opinion
Recipient]
Re: $[__________] Loan (the “Transaction”) from
[_____________________] (“Lender”)
to [________________________] (the “Client”)[4]
Ladies and
Gentlemen:
We provide this
Opinion Letter to you at the request of the above referenced Client pursuant to
Section [_____] of the [Agreement] described below.[5]
BACKGROUND
OPINIONS
Based upon and
subject to the foregoing and to the qualifications set forth below, we are of
the opinion that:
QUALIFICATIONS
Notwithstanding
any provision in this Opinion Letter to the contrary, the foregoing opinions
are subject to the following additional qualifications:
We have no
Actual Knowledge that the foregoing assumptions are false. We have no Actual Knowledge of facts that,
under the circumstances, would make our reliance on the foregoing assumptions
unreasonable.[22]
ADDITIONAL CONFIRMATIONS[40]
USE OF THIS OPINION
Very truly yours,
GLOSSARY
As used in the
Opinion Letter to which this Glossary is attached, except as otherwise defined
in such Opinion Letter, the following terms (whether used in the singular or
the plural) shall have the meanings indicated:
Actual Knowledge: with respect
to the Opinion Giver, the conscious awareness of facts or other information by
the Primary Lawyer or Primary Lawyer Group.
Client: the party or parties to the Transaction
(including predecessor entities where relevant) for which the Opinion Giver
provides legal representation.
Collateral: collectively or individually, all Real
Property described in the Security Documents and all Personal Property
described in the Security Documents, in respect of which provision is made by
the Security Documents for a lien or security interest, unless a different
meaning is given in the Transaction Documents.
Constituent
Documents: the articles or
certificate of incorporation, by-laws, partnership documentation or similar
organization documents of the Client.
Court Orders: court and administrative orders, writs,
judgments and decrees that name the Client and are specifically directed to it
or its property.
Law: the statutes, the judicial and
administrative decisions, and the rules and regulations of the governmental
agencies of the Opining Jurisdiction, including its Local Law (but subject to
any limitations on coverage of Local Law set forth in the Opinion Letter to
which this Glossary is attached).
Local Law: the statutes and ordinances, the
administrative decisions, and the rules and regulations of counties, towns,
municipalities and special political subdivisions (whether created or enabled
through legislative action at the Federal, state or regional
level -- e.g., water
agencies, joint power districts, the Maine Turnpike Authority, The Southern
California Rapid Transit District, the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey), and judicial decisions to the extent that they deal with any of the
foregoing.
Opining
Jurisdiction: a jurisdiction whose
applicable Law is addressed by the Opinion Giver in the Opinion; if there is
more than one such jurisdiction (e.g.,
the United States and a particular state), the term refers collectively to all.[43]
Opinion: a legal opinion that [includes a declaration
that it is governed by the Accord and] is rendered by the Opinion Giver to one
or more persons involved in the Transaction other than the Client.
Opinion Giver: the lawyer or legal organization rendering
the Opinion.
Opinion Letter: the document setting forth the Opinion that
is delivered to and accepted by the Opinion Recipient.
Opinion
Recipient: the addressee or
addressees of the Opinion Letter.
Other Agreements: contracts, other than the Transaction
Documents, to which the Client is a party or by which it or its property is
bound.
Other Counsel: a lawyer or legal organization (other than
the Opinion Giver) providing a legal opinion pertaining to particular matters
concerning the Client, the Transaction Documents or the Transaction
(i) directly to the Opinion Recipient, or (ii) to the Opinion Giver
in support of the Opinion.
Other
Jurisdiction: the jurisdiction whose
law a Transaction Document provides will govern that contract, if not the
Opining Jurisdiction.
Personal
Property: property or rights and
interests in property treated under Law as personalty or otherwise not as Real
Property.
Primary Lawyer:
Primary Lawyer
Group: all of the Primary
Lawyers when there are more than one.
Public Authority
Documents: certificates issued by
the Secretary of State or any other government official, office or agency
concerning a person’s property or status, such as certificates of corporate or
partnership good standing, certificates concerning tax status, certificates
concerning Uniform Commercial Code filings or certificates concerning title
registration or ownership.
Real Property: property or rights and interests in property
treated under Law as real property, including fixtures.
[Security
Documents: mortgages, deeds of
trust, security agreements, assignments of leases, rents or both (regardless of
whether stated as absolute or as a security assignment), or similar instruments
which provide for the creation of a lien on or security interest in Collateral
to secure the obligations of the Client under the Transaction Documents.]
[Transaction: the business exchange (e.g., loan, sale of securities, merger or acquisition) by the
Client and the other parties.]
[Transaction
Documents: the contract documents
setting forth the principal terms of the Transaction addressed by the Opinion,
including the Security Documents, and
other contracts ancillary thereto that are explicitly addressed by the
Opinion. Unless otherwise included by
express statement in an Opinion Letter, contracts of persons other than the
Client (such as guaranties and letters of credit) are not included in the term
Transaction Documents.]
[1] The “Accord” is part of the Third-Party Legal Opinion Report, including
the Legal Opinion Accord, of the Section of Business Law, American Bar
Association, 47 BUS. LAW. 167
(1991) (reprinted in 29 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 487 (1994))(referred to below as the “ABA Business Law Report”).
[2] Report on Adaptation of the Legal Opinion
Accord of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association for Real
Estate Secured Transactions of the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law of the American Bar Association and the American College of Real Estate
Lawyers, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 569 (1994) (referred to
below as the “ABA/ACREL Report”).
[3] W. Shakespeare,
Hamlet, Act 2, Scene 1, line 78 (1601).
[4]References to
Sections (§) and Paragraphs (¶) in the footnotes to this Opinion Letter are
references to Sections and Paragraphs of the Accord and the ABA/ACREL Report.
[5] The Client must consent to the rendering of
the Opinion Letter. Such consent may be
implied by the Client’s execution of a Transaction Document that requires an
opinion letter. See Certain Guidelines for the Negotiation and Preparation of
Third-Party Legal Opinions following the Accord, Part II, F.
[6] Describe limited
or special role, if appropriate. See the Illustrative Opinion Letter
following the Accord.
[7] Set forth below
in the text are examples of common real estate loan transaction documents. This form opines as to the enforceability
only of specifically identified Transaction Documents. See
Section 1.4 of this opinion form. Add
to the list any other operative documents for the Transaction; conform names in
the list to actual names of documents; create other defined terms as
needed. Consider the particular issues
raised, and any additional qualifications that would be appropriate, if a
guaranty is to be one of the Transaction Documents.
[8] The “Security Documents” should include all
documents that provide for the creation of a lien or security interest to
secure obligations of the Client under the Transaction Documents.
[9] See Accord, §1,
§10, §22 . If the Client is a
corporation formed other than in the “State,” the corporate laws of its state
of formation should be named in the Opinion Letter. Under Accord §10(c), coverage of the law in which the Client
exists is implicit in a “Remedies Opinion.”
The Laws of other jurisdictions may be included as well. For example, the “Federal Law of the United
States” may be added. Because the
“Opining Jurisdiction” defined in the attached Glossary can include more than
one jurisdiction, this form introduces the term “State”; if only one
jurisdiction is involved, the term “Opining Jurisdiction” can replace the
“State.”
[10] Accord §2 and
the accompanying commentary permit the Opinion Giver to limit the scope of
inquiry to specific documents, but only if the limitation is explicit; e.g. “we have reviewed only the
following documents and made no other investigation or inquiry.” Some opinion givers prefer to identify each
of the documents reviewed, and to disclaim any factual inquiry beyond the
identified documents.
[11] See Accord §3 and
the accompanying Commentary as to permissible reliance on information provided
by others. Consider specifying the
Public Authority Documents, Client certificates, and other documents so relied
upon.
[12] Accord §8
describes the relationship of the Opinion Giver with Other Counsel giving
opinions in the same Transaction. This
description is rather complex. Consider
carefully the appropriate level of assurance to be given by an Opinion Giver
concerning the legal opinions of Other Counsel.
[13] The opinion in this Paragraph is implicit in the Remedies Opinion under the Accord. See Accord Commentary, §10.4(ii)(A). If the Client is not formed in the State, it would be appropriate to add to the end of this sentence an opinion that the Client also is “qualified to do business in the State.”
[14] The opinion in
this Paragraph is implicit in the Remedies Opinion under the Accord. See
Accord Commentary, §10.4(ii)(B).
Actions by the “Client” include actions by its management, such as the
board of directors of a corporation. In
a partnership or other entity, “partners” or other owners of the ownership
interests in the Client would replace “shareholders” and due diligence should
be expanded to cover any requisite actions and status of the partners or other
owners.
[15]Accord
Commentary §10.4(i) states that the Opinion Giver must have established that
all of the conditions necessary under contract law for formation of a contract
have occurred.
[16] This is the “Remedies Opinion” defined in the Glossary of
the Accord; See also Accord
Commentary §10.1. This Remedies Opinion
follows the Accord formulation that every agreement in the Transaction
Documents is enforceable. While
consistent with the Accord, the bracketed explanation of the Remedies Opinion
is unnecessary and portions of it are superseded by the Generic Qualification
in Paragraph [3.6] below.
If the
Transaction Documents split the choice of law between the Opining Jurisdiction
and other jurisdictions, insert at the beginning of the sentence a phrase such
as
The provisions
which Section __ of the Agreement provides are to be governed by the Law of the
State are legal, valid, ....
If the
Transaction Documents prescribe arbitration, Accord §10 would call for including
a provision to the following effect:
This Paragraph
includes an opinion that a court will give effect to an agreement contained in
the Transaction Documents to arbitrate disputes, but does not indicate how the
arbitration will deal with any dispute under the contract formed by the
Transaction Documents.
If there is a
guaranty, include a similar remedies opinion as to its enforceability against
the guarantor; add the guaranty to the list of documents in paragraph 1.1; and
revise as appropriate the status opinions, the qualifications and other
provisions in this opinion letter.
[17] This lien
opinion is added to the Remedies Opinion of the Accord by ABA/ACREL Report
¶7. Note that this opinion covers only
the form of documents, and does not cover the Financing Statements or
other issues such as actual perfection of liens.
[18] Under the
ABA/ACREL Report ¶10 and ¶16, a usury opinion is implied. The assumption that the amounts paid do not
constitute a penalty is consistent with the Generic Qualification, paragraph
3.6 below.
[19] This Paragraph
is the “No Breach or Default Opinion” referred to in Accord §15. For the “Specified Other Agreements,”
consider using contracts dealing with money borrowed by the Client; contracts
filed by the Client with the SEC; or other written contracts (other than the
Transaction Documents) to which the Client is a party or by which it or its
property is bound.
[20] This Paragraph
is the “No Violation of Law Opinion” referred to in Accord §16, as modified by the ABA/ACREL Report.
[21] These
assumptions are taken from Accord §4.
Subsections (q) and (r) were added by ABA/ACREL Report ¶4.
[22]Accord §5
describes circumstances when assumptions may not be relied upon.
[23]This first
sentence is taken from Accord §18.
[24]This list of
excluded legal issues is taken from Accord §19.
[25] This paragraph
(h) is taken from Paragraph 17 of the ABA/ACREL Report. ABA/ACREL Report ¶18 notes that this
qualification is not inconsistent with the opinion in paragraph [2.5]. Paragraph [2.5] speaks to the form of documents,
while this paragraph (h) covers the actual status of the lien or security
interest. The ABA/ACREL Report notes
that the status of the lien on Real Property Collateral is customarily dealt
with solely by title insurance, and an opinion, if any, as to the status of a
security interest on Personal Property Collateral should be given separately
(if at all).
[26] The
qualifications in Paragraphs 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 of this Opinion Letter correspond
to the General Qualifications described in §§11-14 of the Accord. Consistent with the presumption established
by the Accord, this Opinion Letter is written as if the General Qualifications
are to apply only to the Remedies Opinion (Paragraph 2.4 of this Opinion
Letter). The Accord would permit any or
all of the General Qualifications to be made applicable, by private ordering,
to any opinion in addition to the Remedies Opinion. Similarly, the ABA/ACREL Report would permit the Generic
Qualification in Paragraph 3.6 of this Opinion Letter to be made applicable to opinions
in addition to the Remedies Opinion.
[27] This is the
“Bankruptcy and Insolvency Exception” in Accord §12.
[28] This is the “Equitable Principles
Limitation” in Accord §13.
[29] These are the
“Other Common Qualifications” in Accord §14, as modified by ABA/ACREL Report
¶12 and ¶13. Depending on the Generic
Qualification used in Paragraph [3.6] below, some or all of these Other Common
Qualifications may be superfluous.
[30] See ABA/ACREL
Report ¶13.
[31] Three additional
rules that would have been added to Accord e14 by the “Exposure Draft” of the
ABA/ACREL Report were deleted in the “pre-publication” and “publication”
drafts; viz:
(o) limit
or affect the enforceability of provisions that provide for the application of
insurance or condemnation proceeds to
reduce indebtedness;
(p) limit or affect the enforceability of
provisions that provide for the acceleration of indebtedness upon any transfer or change in the control,
ownership, or management of any party,
(q) limit
or affect the enforceability of provisions purporting to assign the rents,
issues, and profits of the Real
Property Collateral.
Some or all of
these additional qualifications may be appropriate in certain
circumstances. Qualification (q) above
might be expanded, in appropriate circumstances, to disclaim any “true sale” or
“true lease” opinion, as well as disclaiming any opinion that a purported
absolute assignment of rents would be enforced as such.
[32] This is the
“Generic Qualification” as discussed at length in ¶¶11 and 11A of the ABA/ACREL
Report. Those paragraphs in the Report
include an extensive discussion of the use of Generic Qualifications and the
assurances that go with them, and a number of alternative formulations of such
provisions. In addition to the
discussion in the ABA/ACREL Report, the same volume in which it is published
includes another thoughtful analysis.
Karl B. Holtzschue, Opinions on
Real Estate Transactions in a Post-Accord World: The Opinion Giver’s Perspective, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 655, 697-717. The ABA/ACREL
Report did not specifically endorse any particular form of Generic
Qualification. This paragraph is
derived, with some modification, from the American
College of Real Estate Lawyers Statement of Policy on Mortgage Loan
Enforceability Opinions, in THE ATTORNEY’S OPINION LETTER IN REAL ESTATE
TRANSACTIONS 1 (American College of Real Estate Lawyers ed., 1992).
[33] This may have to
be limited for states with single form of action rules and may also have to be
limited for states that impose other limitations on deficiency judgments. Consider, as appropriate, adding to clause
(i) an exception for non-recourse provisions.
[34] As to the use of
the word “material” see Accord
§13(e), and Paragraph [3.4(e)] of this Opinion Letter.
[35] The addition of
comfort that the loan can be accelerated for a material breach of a material
provision is described in Paragraph 11A of the ABA/ACREL Report as a
compromise. Some argue that this phrase
can be a trap for the unwary and that such material provisions should be
specifically identified by including in the opinion letter a list of the
provisions that the recipient of the opinion letter has identified as
significant. On the other hand, others
would respond that this would just replace one laundry list, the provisions
that may not be enforceable (prepared by the opinion giver), with another
laundry list, the provisions important enough to merit specific treatment in
the opinion (prepared by the opinion recipient).
[36] Consider, in
jurisdictions that permit non-judicial sales, expanding the reference in clause
(iii) to foreclosure to include a sale under a power of sale contained in the
Mortgage. Also, it may be appropriate
in some jurisdictions to add reference to other specific collateral documents
such as an assignment of leases and rents.
[37] An alternative
to the comfort in clauses (i) through (iii) is what is known as the “practical
realization” approach, for example: “such unenforceability does not make the
Transaction Documents legally inadequate for the [practical] realization of the
principal benefits or security [intended to be] provided thereby, [subject to
the economic consequences of any delay which may result from applicable law,
rules, or judicial decisions.]” While
this is sometimes referred to as the traditional approach, its use has been
heavily criticized for, among other things, its apparent ambiguity and
subjectivity, by the American College of Real Estate Lawyers (supra, note [29])
and it has fallen into disfavor in many quarters. On the other hand, the practical realization approach has been
included in model forms developed in two recent New York bar reports, Report on
Third-Party “Closing” Opinions, of the Tri-Bar Opinion Committee (Special
Committee on Legal Opinions in Commercial Transactions, New York County
Lawyers’ Association; Corporation Law Committee, The Association of the Bar of
the City of New York; and Special Committee on Legal Opinions of the Business
Law Section, New York State Bar Association), 53 BUS. LAW. 591 (1998); and 1998
Mortgage Loan Opinion Report, of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Committee on Real Property Law, Subcommittee on Mortgage Loan Opinions,
and the New York State Bar Association, Real Property Law Section, Attorney
Opinion Letters Committee (unpublished draft, June 1, 1998). Although recommending against use of
“practical realization” language, the Maryland Bar Report includes a sample
clause which makes the practical realization comfort subject to economic consequences
of delay. Special Joint Comm. of the
Md. State Bar Ass’n & the Bar Ass’n of Baltimore City, Report of the Special Joint Committee on Lawyers Opinions in
Commercial Transactions, 45 Bus. Law. 705 (1990).
[38] The first
sentence in this Paragraph follows Accord §10(b), as modified by ABA/ACREL
Report ¶8.
[39] The second
sentence in this Paragraph follows Accord §10(d)(i) as supplemented by
ABA/ACREL Report ¶9. Despite the
wording in this Paragraph of this Opinion Letter, the ABA/ACREL Report notes
that it would “not be uncommon” for a real estate secured transaction opinion
to exclude any choice of law opinion, and that choice of law opinions, when
given, often are given as reasoned opinions, and upon assumptions of factual
matters having a bearing on the opinion conclusion. Nevertheless, the ABA/ACREL Report would presume (in the absence
of a contrary indication in the Opinion Letter) that the Opinion Giver has
addressed certain aspects of choice of law, such as whether the Opining
Jurisdiction has sufficient nexus to the transaction; whether an Other
Jurisdiction has a closer nexus; and whether the Other Jurisdiction has a
“materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
particular issue,” citing Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws 187(2)(b) (1969).
[40] If an explained opinion is to be provided,
it may be included or referred to at this place in the Opinion Letter.
[41] Include this
paragraph if the Opinion Letter is to provide information as to pending or
threatened legal proceedings. This
paragraph is derived from Accord §17 and the Illustrative Opinion Letter
following the Accord. See also Accord §3(a)(1).
[42] This is taken
from Accord §20. If others are to be
permitted to receive copies of the Opinion Letter or to rely on it, insert a
provision such as the following:
A copy of this
Opinion Letter may be delivered by Lender to [____][lending bank] [syndicate
participants] [subsequent purchasers] [rating agency] [other] in connection
with [state purpose], and such [person] [persons] may rely on this Opinion
Letter as if it were addressed and had been delivered to [it] [them] on the
date hereof.
[43] See Accord § 21.